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A relatively large and reliable “group superiority 
effect” can be found in the research tradition 
comparing individual to group information 
processing (Hinsz, Tindale, & Vollrath, 1997; 
Shaw, 1932; Vollrath, Sheppard, Hinsz, & Davis, 
1989). Of  particular relevance to the present paper 
is the robust finding that collaborative recall is 
superior to individual recall (Clark & Stephenson, 
1989; Hinsz, 1991; Hoppe, 1962; Lorge & 
Solomon, 1962; Tindale & Sheffey, 2002; Weldon 
& Bellinger, 2000) for a wide variety of  stimuli 
(e.g., nonsense syllables, words, stories, events). 
Individual and group performance 
on insight problems: The effects of  
experimentally induced fixation
Christine M. Smith,1 Emily Bushouse,2 and
Jennifer Lord1
Abstract
Recent research has shown that the benefits associated with incubation periods during individual 
problem solving can be explained in terms of  forgetting the material or of  any strategy that serves 
to block progress toward success (e.g., Smith & Blankenship, 1991). While interacting groups reliably 
outperform individuals on both problem-solving and recall tasks, groups’ superior memory capacity 
may serve to hinder problem solving, especially when fixation has occurred. In the present study, 
individuals and three-person groups attempted to solve a set of  20 rebus puzzles on two different 
occasions. In the first session rebuses were accompanied by “clues,” that were designed to either 
help or hinder problem solving. Following a 15-minute filled incubation period, the rebuses were 
again presented without the clues. As expected, groups recalled more of  the clues than did individual 
problem solvers. Additionally, individual problem-solvers’ performance was improved following the 
incubation period on the misleading clue items but not the good clue items. Following incubation, 
groups improved on both the helpful and misleading clue items. The possibility that incubation effects 
may vary with task type in group problem-solving contexts is discussed.
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Groups are assumed to outperform individuals 
on tasks involving recall because of  their larger 
storage capacity, their ability to distribute and 
organize information in transactive memory 
systems (Wegner, 1987), and because of  the cross-
cuing that occurs in collaborative recall (Meudell, 
Hitch, & Boyle, 1995; Stasson & Bradshaw, 1995). 
Cross-cuing occurs when the memories recalled 
by one group member prompt fellow group 
members to recall information that they would 
otherwise have failed to retrieve. The increased 
capacity to encode, store, and retrieve informa-
tion possessed by groups is assumed to be associ-
ated with enhanced problem solving, which, in 
part, accounts for the extremely robust finding 
that groups outperform individuals on problem-
solving tasks (Davis, 1969; Hinsz et al., 1997).
While it is intuitively appealing to assume 
that enhanced memory processes necessarily lead 
to better problem solving, the act of  forgetting 
may also produce better problem-solving per-
formance under certain conditions, especially 
in contexts where fixation has occurred (Smith, 
& Blankenship, 1989, 1991; Smith & Vela, 1991). 
Analogous to a “mental rut,” fixation occurs 
when an individual fails to abandon faulty infor-
mation or ineffective strategies in her/his attempt 
to solve a problem, thereby preventing insightful 
discovery (Duncker, 1945; Luchins, 1942). One 
well-explored remedy for fixation involves 
spending time away from the problem, or incu-
bation (Olton, 1979). While explanations for the 
incubation process are varied, the forgetting-fixa-
tion hypothesis is of  particular importance in this 
study (Smith & Blankenship, 1989).
According to the forgetting-fixation hypothesis, 
the faulty information or strategy applied during 
the fixation state blocks the ability to retrieve 
alternative strategies or more appropriate infor-
mation from memory. Incubation periods allow 
for the forgetting of  inappropriate information, 
thereby making appropriate information more 
accessible in memory (Smith, 1995). Smith and 
his colleagues, using a wide variety of  research 
paradigms and experimental tasks, have generated 
ample evidence in support of  the forgetting-
fixation hypothesis (Smith & Blankenship, 1991; 
Smith & Tindell, 1997; Smith & Vela, 1991). In one 
study, individuals were asked to solve several 
rebus puzzles under conditions of  experimentally 
induced fixation (Smith & Blankenship, 1989). 
Rebuses are word/picture puzzles that typi-
cally represent common sayings or phrases. For 
example, “wheather” represents the expression 
“an ill spell of  weather” and “you just me” repre-
sents the expression “just between you and me.” 
Smith and Blankenship (1989) created states of  
fixation by presenting misleading “clues” that 
were demonstrated to hinder problem solving 
along with several of  the rebus problems (e.g., the 
words “or not” with the ill spell of  weather puz-
zle or “beside” with the puzzle just between you 
and me). Consistent with the forgetting-fixation 
hypothesis, the blocking effect created by the 
misleading clues diminished over time and higher 
rates of  problem solving were associated with 
longer incubation periods. That is, with the pas-
sage of  time the misleading clue that was designed 
to block the generation of  the puzzle’s correct 
solution became less accessible to the problem 
solver (i.e., it was forgotten), thereby making it 
more likely that the individual would access more 
appropriate information.
In the present study we examined the forget-
ting-fixation hypothesis within the context of  
freely interacting three-person groups. More spe-
cifically, we explored the possibility that a group’s 
superior memory capacity could serve to hinder 
its problem-solving ability under conditions of  
experimentally induced fixation. When problem-
solving success is dependent upon the forgetting 
of  that which blocks access to relevant informa-
tion, groups may be at a distinct disadvantage, at 
least relative to individuals, because the likelihood 
that groups will abandon an ineffective strategy 
through the process of  forgetting is much lower 
than it is for individuals. Stated somewhat differ-
ently, in contexts where fixation has occurred, the 
benefits that are typically associated with incuba-
tion periods for the individual problem solver 
may be less pronounced in a group problem-solv-
ing context.
We employed a slightly modified version of  
the Smith and Blankenship (1989) paradigm in 
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that a set of  rebus puzzles, half  associated with 
helpful clues and half  associated with misleading 
clues were presented to individuals and three-
person groups at two points in time. At the 
pretest, each rebus puzzle was presented 
along with a clue. Following the 15-minute incu-
bation period, each rebus puzzle was presented 
again, this time without its corresponding clue. 
Consistent with several well-established princi-
ples of  group information processing as well as 
the forgetting-fixation hypothesis, it was hypoth-
esized that groups would recall more of  the asso-
ciated clues following an incubation period than 
would individuals. Consequently, in light of  their 
enhanced ability to recall the associated clues, 
groups were predicted to perform best on the 
rebus puzzles paired with helpful clues (i.e., 
remembering useful information would facili-
tate solving the puzzle) and less well on the 
rebus puzzles paired with misleading clues (i.e., 
remembering misleading information would 
block access to the problem’s solution). A pattern 
opposite that predicted for group problem solvers 
was expected for the individuals. That is, individ-
uals were expected to perform best on the items 
associated with misleading clues (i.e., forgetting 
the misleading clue would allow more appropri-
ate information to be accessible).
While opposite patterns across the two puzzle 
types are expected for individuals and groups, it was 
considered likely that groups would still outperform 
individual problem solvers. In other words, while 
groups might not be able to reap the benefits associ-
ated with incubation to the same degree that indi-
viduals were expected to, this difference was not 
expected to attenuate or completely cancel out the 
known benefits associated with problem-solving in 
groups. This prediction is consistent with the “truth-
wins” group decision process that has been demon-
strated in past research comparing individual to 
group performance on problems with highly 
demonstrable solutions (Laughlin & Ellis, 1986; 
Laughlin, Kerr, Munch, & Haggarty, 1976), as well 
as Lorge and Solomon’s (1955) “Model A,” an early 
mathematical model of  group performance. Each 
states that the probability of  a group solving a par-
ticular problem correctly is equal to the probability 
that the group contains at least one member who is 
capable of  solving the problem correctly. That is, 
once a single individual within the group generates 
the correct response, as long as she/he can demon-
strate the veracity of  the position to others, she/he 
has little difficulty convincing the group to adopt 
that response as their own. When groups work on 
easily demonstrated intellective tasks (i.e., tasks with 
correct responses) they outperform the average 
individual, but not necessarily the “best” individuals 
(but see Laughlin, Hatch, Silver, & Boh, 2006).
Method
Participants and design
One hundred and twenty-six introductory psy-
chology students at a large Midwestern University 
were randomly assigned to participate as either 
individuals (N = 24) or as members of  three-person 
groups (N = 102, 34 groups). All participants 
received course credit for their involvement in the 
experiment. A 2 (problem-solving entity: Group/
Individual) × 2 (clue type: Helpful/Misleading)
× 2 (time of  performance: Pretest/Posttest) 
mixed design was used. Both clue type and time 
of  performance were within-subjects variables.
Experimental stimuli
A set of  20 (4 extremely easy, 16 difficult) rebus 
puzzles were developed for use in the study. A 
“clue” was developed for each rebus puzzle and 
12 clues were designed to increase the likelihood 
that the rebus puzzle was solved. Eight “clues” 
were designed to hinder solving the rebuses with 
which they were associated. Extensive pilot test-
ing of  the rebuses and the clues verified their 
overall level of  difficulty as well as the effects of  
each clue.1 The four easy rebus puzzles were asso-
ciated with extremely helpful clues and these 
puzzles were presented first in an attempt to 
enhance the perception that the clues would 
indeed facilitate solving the puzzles. These easy 
rebus problems were solved by all participants in 
the study and were not included in any of  the 
analyses presented below (i.e., the analyzed prob-
lem set included 16 difficult rebus problems, 
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eight with helpful clues and eight with clues 
designed to hinder performance).
Procedure
The entire experiment was presented to par-
ticipants via the stimulus presentation software 
SuperLab 4.0. Individuals and three-person 
groups were seated in front of  a large compu-
ter screen and given a sheet with 20 numbered 
lines on which to record their answers (in the 
group condition the sheet was given to a single 
randomly chosen individual). The first screen 
of  the program, shown at the start of  the 
experiment, contained detailed instructions 
regarding how the participants were to move 
through the experiment. In addition, they were 
also shown two sample rebus problems along 
with an explanation regarding how they were to 
be solved. Participants were not aware that they 
would be tested on the rebus problems a second 
time nor that their memory for the clues 
would be assessed. Participants in the group 
condition were asked to work collaboratively 
on the puzzles.
Before each puzzle, a clue was presented for 
three seconds followed immediately by the rebus 
which was shown for 30 seconds.2 The partici-
pants were not allowed to return to a rebus puz-
zle once it had disappeared from the screen. 
After the last rebus problem was presented, all 
participants were given a filler task which consisted 
of  ten difficult mathematical “brain-teaser” 
puzzles, each presented for 90 seconds. These 
problems created the 15-minute filled incuba-
tion period. Following the incubation period, all 
participants were once again shown the 20 rebus 
problems for 30 seconds each, but on this trial 
the puzzles were presented without their respec-
tive “clues.” Additionally, the order in which the 
rebuses were presented differed from the pretest. 
Finally, participants were shown the 20 rebuses 
(in yet another random order) and were asked to 
recall and record the clue that was associated 
with each rebus puzzle.
Results
Clue memory was analyzed with a 2 (problem-
solving entity: Group/Individual) × 2 (clue type: 
Helpful/Misleading) ANOVA. As expected, 
groups recalled more clues (M = 6.69, SD = .13) 
than did individuals (M = 3.98, SD = .19), F (1, 56) = 
121.36, p = .01, η2 = .64. Helpful clues were recalled 
more frequently (M = 5.92, SD = .155) than mis-
leading clues (M = 4.74, SD = .150), F(1, 56) = 
43.04, p = .01, η2 = .43. However, clue type did not 
interact with problem-solving entity, F(1, 56) = 
.611, p = .44. That is, group recall (M = 7.35, 
SD = 1.09) exceeded individual recall (M = 4.50, 
SD = .23) for helpful clues as well as misleading 
clues (M = 6.03, SD = .93 and 3.46, SD = .23, 
respectively).
Solutions to the 16 difficult/critical rebus 
problems were analyzed with a 2 (problem-
solving entity: Group/individual) × 2 (clue type: 
Helpful/misleading) × 2 (time of  performance: 
Pretest/Posttest) mixed ANOVA. The means 
and standard deviations for each condition are 
presented in the top half  of  Table 1. With 
respect to main effects, as predicted, groups 
outperformed individual problem solvers, 
F(1, 56) = 36.78, p = .01, η2 = .40. Performance 
improved from pretest to posttest, F(1, 56) = 
95.43, p = .01, η2 = .63, and rebuses that were 
associated with helpful clues were solved at a 
higher rate than were those that were associated 
with misleading clues, F(1, 56) = 4.58, p = .04, 
η
2= .08. Time of  performance interacted with 
problem-solving entity, F(1, 56) = 7.74, p = 
.01, η2 = .12. That is, group performance 
improved more than did individual perform-
ance from pretest to posttest. Clue type inter-
acted with problem-solving entity F(1, 56) = 
9.18, p = .01, η2 = .14. Overall, groups per-
formed worse on the rebuses associated with 
misleading clues relative to helpful clues, whereas 
individuals performed similarly on helpful and 
misleading clue rebuses. The three-way (Entity × 
Clue Type × Time) interaction was not signifi-
cant, F(1, 56) = .37, p = .54.
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The overall performance of  the individuals was 
consistent with the fixation-forgetting hypothesis. 
Performance was significantly improved on the 
misleading clue items following incubation, t(23) = 
4.74, p = .00 and unchanged on the helpful clue 
items, t(23) = 1.15, p = .26. Additionally, at the 
posttest, individuals performed better on the 
items associated with misleading clues relative to 
the items associated with helpful clues, t(23) = 
2.71, p = .01. With respect to group performance, 
significant improvements following incubation 
were found for both misleading clue items, t(33) = 
7.87, p = .00 and for helpful clue items, t(33) = 
3.91, p = .00. While the difference between helpful 
and misleading clue items at the posttest was in the 
direction predicted, this difference did not reach 
statistical significance, t(33) = 1.25, p = .21.
In order to explore further the groups’ enhanced 
performance on the rebus problems we carried 
out a set of  analyses parallel to those described 
above but this time compared interacting groups 
to nominal groups created from the individuals in 
our sample. Individuals were randomly assigned 
to one of  eight three-person nominal groups. 
Within each of  these groups, the best and worst 
nominal group member with respect to memory 
for the rebus clues was identified and her/his 
solutions to the rebus puzzles were considered as 
the “best” and “worst” member performances, 
respectively. Creating such nominal groups allowed 
us to test group performance relative to the most 
and least competent members as well as to assess 
better the extent to which group interaction was 
beneficial to recall and problem solving (Steiner 
& Rajaratnam, 1961). That is, while the above 
analyses suggest that group performance was 
superior in all regards, it is important to assess 
whether interacting groups outperformed the 
best member on rebus problems associated with 
good clues as well as whether they outperformed 
the worst member on problems associated with 
misleading clues (where forgetting is associated 
with better performance). While the results of  
these analyses are interesting, we have interpreted 
them with some caution given the very small 
number of  nominal groups we were able to 
create and the resulting insensitivity of  the statis-
tical tests we applied (Keppel, 1973).
Clue memory was analyzed with 3 (problem-
solving entity: Best nominal group member/Worst 
nominal group member/Interacting group) ×
2 (Clue type: Helpful/Misleading) ANOVA. As 
expected, interacting groups recalled more clues 
(M = 6.69, SD = .13) than did best (M = 4.87, SD = 
.28) and worst (M = 2.94, SD = .28) nominal 
group members, F(1,47) = 80.27, p = .01, η2 = .77. 
All problem-solving entities were significantly dif-
ferent from one another (p = .01). Helpful clues 
were recalled more frequently (M = 6.44, SD = 
1.80) than misleading clues (M = 5.16, SD = 1.71), 
Table 1. Mean number of  rebus puzzles solved prior to (pre) and following (post) 15-minute incubation period
 Rebus type 
 Helpful clue Misleading clue
 Pre Post Pre Post
Problem solving entity 
  Individuals  1.50 (1.25) 1.71 (1.30) 1.21 (1.02) 2.37 (1.34)
  Groups  3.62 (1.75) 4.24 (1.60) 1.91 (1.02) 3.76 (1.67)
Nominal groups*
  Best member .75 (.70) 1.12 (.83) 1.00 (.75) 1.75 (1.28)
  Worst member 2.37 (1.68) 2.25 (1.58)  1.25 (1.38)  2.62 (1.50) 
Note: *Best and worst member determined by number of  clues recalled. Standard deviations in parentheses.
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F(1,47) = 25.06, p = .01, η2 = .35. However, clue 
type did not interact with problem-solving entity, 
F(1, 47) = .06, p = .93. That is, interacting groups’ 
recall (M = 7.35, SD = 1.9) exceeded best nominal 
group members’ recall (M = 5.50, SD = .92) and 
worst nominal group members’ recall (M = 3.50, 
SD = 1.19) for helpful clues as well as for misleading 
clues (M = 6.03, SD = .93; M = 4.24, SD = 1.03; 
M = 2.38, SD = 1.30, respectively).
Solutions to the 16 difficult/critical rebus prob-
lems were analyzed with a 3 (problem-solving 
entity: Best nominal group member/Worst nomi-
nal group member/Interacting group) × 2 (clue 
type: Helpful/misleading) × 2 (time of  perform-
ance: Pretest/Posttest) mixed ANOVA. The means 
and standard deviations for each nominal group 
type are presented in the bottom half  of  Table 1. 
With respect to main effects, performance varied as 
a function of  problem-solving entity F(2,47) = 
16.37, p = .01, η2 = .41. Interacting groups per-
formed significantly better than the best nominal 
group members (p = .01) and better than the worst 
nominal group members (p = .01). The nominal 
group members with the worst clue memory out-
performed the nominal group members with the 
best clues memory; however, this difference was 
only marginally significant (p = .07). Performance 
improved from pretest to posttest, F(1,47) = 38.40, 
p = .01, η2 = .45. Rebuses that were associated with 
helpful clues were not solved at a higher rate than 
were those that were associated with misleading 
clues, F(1, 47) = 1.34, p = .25. Time of  per-
formance interacted with problem-solving entity, 
F(2, 47) = 4.10, p = .02, η2 = .14. That is, change 
from pretest to posttest was significantly greater for 
interacting groups than it was for either best or 
worst nominal group members. There was a mar-
ginally significant interaction between clue type and 
problem-solving entity F(2, 47) = 2.91, p = .06, 
η
2 = .11. Performance on the good clue items is 
significantly better than performance on the mis-
leading clue items for interacting groups (p = .01). 
Clue type is not reliably associated with perform-
ance for best member or for worst member nominal 
groups (p = .11 and .24, respectively). The three-
way (Entity × Clue Type × Time) interaction was 
not significant, F(2, 47) = .99, p = .37.
Interacting groups outperformed the best 
members of  nominal groups on the items associ-
ated with helpful clues, F(1, 40) = 26.06, p = .01, 
η
2 = .39. Likewise, interacting groups outper-
formed the worst members of  nominal groups 
on items associated with misleading clues; however 
this difference was only marginally significant, 
F(1, 40) = .06, η2 = .08.
Discussion
Successful problem solving is often dependent 
upon the ability to abandon faulty information or 
ineffective strategies in favor of  more effective 
alternatives. The ease with which one successfully 
adopts new alternatives is determined, in part, by 
the extent to which old alternatives interfere with 
or block the generation of  more suitable prob-
lem-solving strategies. In the present study we 
explored the possibility that when faced with fix-
ation, groups would benefit less from incubation 
periods, relative to individuals, because they would 
be less inclined to forget that which serves to 
block alternative strategy generation. As expected, 
groups did recall more of  the clues associated 
with the rebus problems than did the individuals. 
Additionally, consistent with the work on collab-
orative recall, interacting groups performed 
better than the best member of  nominal groups 
with respect to clue recall. Also consistent with pre-
dictions, groups solved more of  the rebus puzzles 
than did individuals. This general pattern was also 
observed when individuals were combined to 
create nominal groups. Clearly, group interaction 
was associated with enhanced performance with 
respect to both recall and problem solving.
While individuals exhibited the problem-
solving patterns predicted by the fixation-forgetting 
hypothesis, group performance improved follow-
ing incubation on both the helpful and the mis-
leading clue items, this, despite the fact that their 
memory for the misleading clues was quite high. 
Stated somewhat differently, groups appear to 
have benefited from incubation in a manner quite 
inconsistent with the fixation-forgetting hypothesis. 
Contrary to the prediction explicated, the increment 
of  improvement following incubation for groups 
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was greatest for rebus puzzles associated with 
misleading clues. Several possible explanations 
exist for the overall group problem-solving 
patterns found.
It is possible that the misleading clues failed to 
create a state of  fixation within the groups com-
parable to that experienced by the individuals. 
While this possibility cannot be completely ruled 
out with the data we have available to us, it seems 
a less likely explanation in light of  the groups’ 
performance on the pretest rebus puzzles associ-
ated with misleading clues. Clearly, the misleading 
clues appear to have interfered with the groups’ 
ability to generate correct solutions to the puzzles 
at the pretest.
An alternative and perhaps more interesting 
explanation involves the possibility that fixated 
states were not experienced uniformly by group 
members, that is, all group members did not 
remember the associated clues following the 
incubation period (a likely outcome if  one gener-
alizes from the individual clue memory data). If  
groups did not begin their second attempt to 
solve the rebus problem by first generating the 
clue from an individual’s memory, some individ-
ual members of  the group may have indeed ben-
efited from the incubation period (i.e., forgotten 
the clue that served to block the solution). This 
possibility is especially important to explore in 
light of  the nature of  the task used in this par-
ticular study. While the rebus problems were 
quite difficult, they were likely extremely high in 
demonstrability (i.e., a eureka-type task). That is, 
once a group member discovered the solution to 
the puzzle, it was unlikely that she/he experi-
enced difficulty convincing fellow group mem-
bers to adopt that answer. Therefore, it may be 
that those who had forgotten the clue were also the 
ones to generate the solution to the rebus puzzle. 
In this particular context, then, the process that 
occurred may have been analogous to the “truth-
wins” decision process that is reliably observed in 
the group problem-solving literature (e.g., Laughlin 
& Ellis, 1986). That is, groups escaped their 
fixated state when at least one individual who was 
capable of  solving the problem also forgot the 
information that blocked access to the solution. 
When working on a eureka task, the presence of  
one solver is predictive of  the group solving the 
problem. Likewise it may be that when fixated, a 
group’s success is determined, at least in part, by 
the presence of  a member who is no longer in a 
fixated state. The performance of  the nominal 
group members with the worst memories for the 
clues is consistent with this notion; however, it is 
important to note that interacting groups outper-
formed these nominal groups. While all of  the 
analyses carried out are consistent with the notion 
that the group interaction process was critical to 
the enhanced group performance observed in this 
study, the nature of  this process cannot be under-
stood fully given the nature of  the data presently 
available to us. The collection of  group interac-
tion process data seems essential to developing 
such an understanding.
Additionally, it seems important that future 
research systematically address both group 
problem-solving norms and task characteristics 
as important variables in predicting the effects of  
incubation in problem-solving groups. If, for 
example, groups develop a norm whereby they 
reliably return to where they left off  right before 
an incubation period and it is customary to state 
this explicitly (in this context, first generating the 
clue, stating the clue out loud and then proceed-
ing to search for the solution), we would predict 
that the benefits associated with incubation would 
be attenuated for groups relative to individuals. 
That is, returning to where one left off  would 
serve to ensure uniform fixation states across 
group members. Likewise, it is our suspicion that 
the effects associated with incubation in groups is 
also likely to vary along the task demonstrability 
dimension. Solutions to tasks low in demon-
strability may seem less “correct” if  the solution 
deviates considerably from the information/
strategy that serves to create a fixated state. 
For example, creative solutions to problems and 
innovative ideas may be less well received by 
fellow group members who are intent upon 
adhering to an old plan.
While we are unable to offer an unequivocal 
explanation for the group problem-solving pat-
terns found, the current study serves as a valuable 
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first step towards understanding incubation 
effects in groups while also generating many 
interesting questions that ought to be addressed 
in future research.
Notes
1. Pilot testing was carried out with individual prob-
lem solvers and involved comparing solution rates 
under clue present and clue absent conditions. All 
of  the helpful clue puzzles in the current research 
were solved significantly more frequently under 
clue present conditions and significantly less 
frequently under clue present conditions when the 
associated clue was misleading.
2. The exposure duration for each rebus problem was 
exactly that used by Smith & Blankenship (1989).
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